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(2022-10-5 13:00)
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(2022-10-5 13:00)
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(2022-10-5 13:00)
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(2022-10-5 12:00)
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Personal Relationship Goods
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2022-10-5 11:05)
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[Revised entry by Anca Gheaus on October 4, 2022.
Changes to: Main text]
Over the past decades, political philosophers and applied ethicists have been increasingly interested in the value of personal relationships. The goods they generate - or, perhaps, of which they consist - are obviously important, both instrumentally and non-instrumentally, for how well individuals' lives go on various accounts of what makes a life good: They are highly desired by most people, can bring a lot of pleasure and joy and, at least some of them - such as friendship or love - have objective value. More...
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from ¸üÀ¸Ï«Æ¯¾Ê¿·Ãå¾ðÊó
(2022-10-5 11:00)
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The Normative Status of Logic
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2022-10-5 8:46)
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[Revised entry by Florian Steinberger on October 4, 2022.
Changes to: Bibliography]
We consider it to be a bad thing to be inconsistent. Similarly, we criticize others for failing to appreciate (at least the more obvious) logical consequences of their beliefs. In both cases there is a failure to conform one's attitudes to logical strictures. We generally take agents who fall short of the demands of logic to be rationally defective. This suggests that logic has a normative role to play in our rational economy; it instructs us how we ought or ought not to think or reason. The notion that logic has such a normative...
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The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2022-10-5 8:34)
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[Revised entry by Fernando Rudy-Hiller on October 4, 2022.
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography]
Philosophers usually acknowledge two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a person to be morally responsible for an action, i.e., susceptible to be praised or blamed for it: a control condition (also called freedom condition) and an epistemic condition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or mental condition). The first condition has to do with whether the agent possessed an adequate degree of control or freedom in performing the action, whereas the second condition is concerned with whether the agent's epistemic...
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Moral Arguments for the Existence of God
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2022-10-5 8:21)
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[Revised entry by C. Stephen Evans and David Baggett on October 4, 2022.
Changes to: Main text, Bibliography]
Moral arguments for God's existence form a diverse family of arguments that reason from some feature of morality or the moral life to the existence of God, usually understood as a morally good creator of the universe. Moral arguments are both important and interesting. They are interesting because evaluating their soundness requires attention to practically every important philosophical issue dealt with in metaethics. They are important because of their prominence in popular apologetic arguments for religious belief. Evidence for this...
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from ʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê¡¡¿·Ãå¾ðÊó
(2022-10-5 0:00)
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