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Kant's Moral Philosophy  from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (2016-7-8 11:03) 
[Revised entry by Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton on July 7, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a standard of rationality that he dubbed the "Categorical Imperative" (CI). Kant characterized the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must always follow despite any natural desires or inclinations we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI. Other...
Moral Motivation  from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (2016-7-8 10:36) 
[Revised entry by Connie S. Rosati on July 7, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] In our everyday lives, we confront a host of moral issues. Once we have deliberated and formed judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, these judgments tend to have a marked hold on us. Although in the end, we do not always behave as we think we ought, our moral judgments typically motivate us, at least to some degree, to act in accordance with them. When philosophers talk about moral motivation, this is the basic phenomenon that they seek to understand. Moral motivation is an instance of a...
Medieval Theories of Consequence  from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (2016-7-8 10:13) 
[Revised entry by Catarina Dutilh Novaes on July 7, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography, notes.html] Latin medieval theories of consequence are systematic analyses by Latin medieval authors[1] of the logical relations between sentences[2], in particular the notions of entailment and valid inference. When does a sentence B follow from a sentence A? (For example, from 'Every human is an animal' one may infer 'Some...
The Metaphysics of Causation  from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (2016-7-6 11:22) 
[Revised entry by Jonathan Schaffer on July 5, 2016. Changes to: Main text, Bibliography] What must a world be like, to host causal relations? When the cue ball knocks the nine ball into the corner pocket, in virtue of what is this a case of causation? Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided into questions about the causal relata, and questions about the causal relation. Questions about the causal relata include the questions of...
Wittgenstein: Epistemology  from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (2016-7-6 3:58) 
Wittgenstein: Epistemology Although Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally more known for his works on logic and on the nature of language, but throughout his philosophical journey he reflected extensively also on epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, doubt, and certainty. This interest is more evident in his final notebook, published posthumously as On Certainty (1969, henceforth … Continue reading Wittgenstein: Epistemology →
¥¦¥§¥ó¥Õ¥¤¾Þ2016¤ÎÊ罸¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¡ÊÊ¿À®28ǯ7·î22ÆüÄùÀÚ¡Ë  from ʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê¡¡¿·Ãå¾ðÊó  (2016-7-5 17:00) 

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¥¤¥ó¥¿¡¼¥ó¥·¥Ã¥×¤Î¿ä¿ÊÅù¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ëÄ´ºº¸¦µæ¶¨ÎϼԲñµÄ¡ÊÂè1²ó¡Ë¤Î³«ºÅ¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ  from ʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê¡¡¿·Ãå¾ðÊó  (2016-7-5 17:00) 

¶µ°é²ÝÄøÉô²ñ¡¡ÆÃÊ̻ٱ綵°éÉô²ñ¡ÊÂè8²ó¡Ë¡¡µÄ»öÏ¿  from ʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê¡¡¿·Ãå¾ðÊó  (2016-7-5 17:00) 

Ê¿À®27ǯÅÙʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê°ÑÂ÷Ä´ºº¡Ö¶µ°é¤Î¼ÁŪž´¹¤ò¿Þ¤ë¿Íͤʳؽ¤¥¹¥Ú¡¼¥¹¤ÎÀ°È÷¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë»öÎã¡×  from ʸÉô²Ê³Ø¾Ê¡¡¿·Ãå¾ðÊó  (2016-7-5 17:00) 




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